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COMMENTS

Feticide in Illinois: Legislative
Amelioration of a Common Law Rule
I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 21, 1978, Alan Greer beat his girlfriend to death,
causing as well the death of the eight and one-half month old fetus
she carried. Greer was convicted of the murders of both the girl and
the fetus, and was sentenced to death.' The Supreme Court of Illinois, however, reversed the murder conviction for the death of the
fetus,2 questioning whether the killing of a fetus could constitute
murder.' In order to answer this question they examined the homicide
statute' and*found the born-alive rule to be a barrier to murder prosecutions based on fetal death.'
1. Greer had spent much of the day in a tavern, after which he went home
and argued with, then beat, his pregnant girlfriend Sharon Moss. A pathologist testified
that both she and her 8 month old fetus died as a result of the beating, which
had included blows with a broomstick. People v. Greer, 79 Il1. 2d 103, 108-09, 402
N.E.2d 203, 205-06 (1980).
2. Id. Greer was sentenced to death under § 9-1(b)(3) of the Criminal Code,
which allows the death penalty for the intentional killing of two or more individuals.
By reversing one of Greer's convictions, the Illinois Supreme Court made the death
penalty unavailable. Criminal Code of 1961, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-(b)(3) (Supp.
1982).
3. The court regarded this as a question of first impression in Illinois. It
distinguished People v. Ryan, 9 Ill. 2d 467, 138 N.E.2d 516 (1956), which involved
infanticide, as the death producing acts therein followed the live birth of the child.
Greer, 79 Ill. 2d at 110, 402 N.E.2d at 206.
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Supp. 1982). The court also looked to the
Committee Comments, which explain the Code, for additional guidance. ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1, Committee Comments (Smith-Hurd 1979).
5. Only "individuals" are protected under the homicide statute. The common
law, which was codified by the statute, included only those born alive within the
definition of "individual." Greer, 79 Ill. 2d at 110-11, 402 N.E.2d at 206-07. See
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1, Committee Comments 13, 17 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
In the context of a murder prosecution, the born-alive rule means that the
victim must be born alive and subsequently die as a result of the defendant's conduct. "In the United States the 'born alive' requirement has come to mean that
the fetus be fully brought forth and establish an 'independent circulation' before
it can be considered a human being." W. LAFAVE & A. Sco1r JR., HANDBOOK ON
CR MiNAL LAW

§ 67, at 531 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
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The Illinois legislature responded to the Greer decision by enacting a feticide statute' which proscribed the killing of human fetuses
in limited circumstances.' The statute allows criminal prosecution of
a person who, while performing acts intended to cause death or great
bodily harm to a visibly pregnant woman, causes the death of a viable
fetus.'

This article will first review the history and rationale of the born-

6. The debates of both houses of the Illinois General Assembly indicated that
the decision in People v. Greer prompted the feticide statute. In debate on the floor
of the Senate, where the feticide statute originated, Senator Randy Thomas, the bill's
sponsor, discussing the language of the provision, stated that this was "the type
of language necessary and the type of language that the Illinois Supreme Court,
in People v. Greer, suggested that the General Assembly take a look at last year."
Ill. Senate Debates, 82nd Gen. Assembly, 41st Legislative Day (May 19, 1981)
(available on microfiche at 198).
In the House Debates, Representative Jack Davis referred to the Greer decision, stating "[t]his bill would close the gap in the Greer case." Ill. House
Debates, 82nd Gen. Assembly, 66th Legislative Day (June 18, 1981) (available on
microfiche at 167).
7. The statute's proscription is limited by subsection (c) which excludes legal
abortions, necessary therapeutic abortions, and the justifiable use of force regulated
by Article 7 of chapter 38. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1.1(c) (1981).
8. The Illinois feticide statute reads:
§ 9-1.1. Feticide. (a) A person commits the offense of feticide who
causes the death of a fetus if, in performing the acts which caused the death,
be [sic], without lawful justification:
(1) either intended to kill or do great bodily harm to the mother carrying the fetus or knew that such acts would cause death or great bodily harm
to the mother; or
(2) he knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to the mother; or
(3) he was attempting or committing a forcible felony against the mother
other than voluntary manslaughter; and
(4) he knew, or reasonably should have known under all the circumstances, that the mother was pregnant.
(b) For purposes of this Section, "fetus" means a fetus which the physician or pathologist performing the fetal autopsy determines, based upon
the particular facts of the case before him, to have been capable, at the
time of its death, of sustained life outside of the mother's womb with or
without life support equipment, and such capacity for sustained life is proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.
(c) the provision of this Section shall not apply to any person who
commits any act which results in the death of a fetus if:
(1) the act complied with the "Illinois Abortion Law of 1975"; or
(2) the act was committed by a physician licensed in Illinois to practice
medicine in all of its branches in a case where, to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, the result of childbirth would be the death of the mother
of the fetus, or where her death from childbirth, although not medically
certain, would be substantially certain or more likely than not; or
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alive rule, which has been the primary hurdle to prosecution for fetal
death. Then, consideration of how the rule has affected judicial decisions and thereby prompted legislative action in the states of California and Louisiana will be undertaken. In addition, the reactions of
the courts of those two states to the resulting legislation will be
presented as an aid in predicting how the untested Illinois law might
be interpreted. Next, an in-depth analysis of the events which led to
the adoption of feticide legislation in Illinois is provided. Finally, an
overview of the elements of the statute is undertaken, in order to
determine what types of conduct are criminalized thereunder, and to
explain some apparent anomalies which result from the language of
the statute.

II.

THE BORN ALIVE RULE:

A

BARRIER TO PROTECTION OF THE FETUS

A discussion of the principles of feticide, or any other law related
to the rights and protections of the unborn, calls for at least a cursory review of history. This reflection on history is appropriate because
determining the point at which society will recognize the fetus as an
entity possessing rights worthy of protection has, throughout history,
instigated a great deal of debate, culminating in conflicting determinations within the legal community. For ease of analysis, this historical
review will be divided into two parts: an examination of the criminal
law, followed by an overview of tort law.
A.

CRIMINAL LAW

When specified conduct directed against a "person" is criminalized, prosecution under the law necessitates some designation of when
a potential victim attains the status of "person" within the law. Concerning acts which result in the loss of life, the common law limited
the class of potential victims to those born alive. Sir Edward Coke
stated the born-alive rule as follows:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth
it in her wombe, or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dyeth
in her body, and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great
(3) the act which caused the death of the fetus was performed against
the mother of the fetus under circumstances which would justify performance of the act under the provisions of Article 7 of the Criminal Code
of 1961.

(d) Penalty. The sentence for feticide shall be the same as for murder,
except that the death penalty may not be imposed.
(e) The provisions of this Section shall not be construed to prohibit
the prosecution of any person under any other provisions of law.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1.1 (1981).
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misprision .... and no murder; but if the childe be born alive and
dyeth of the potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder; for in
law it is accounted a reasonable creature, in rerum natura, when
it is born alive. 9
Basically, the rule provides that no protection under the law would
be afforded to a fetus until born alive. The live birth requirement

has resulted in a historical distinction between infanticide,'" which
is punished as homicide," and feticide.' 2

The born-alive rule was established to avoid criminal prosecution in cases where the critical nexus between the conduct of the actor and fetal death was based on mere conjecture.' 3 This conjecture
resulted from the absence of sophisticated techniques in the area of
forensic medicine, which made proof of the causal element difficult,
as well as from the high infant mortality rates of the time."'
Contemporary medical technology largely eliminates the necessity of the born-alive rule in that it allows more definite proof of causation. In People v. Guthrie," which involved prosecution for negligent
homicide based on conduct that resulted in the death of a fetus, the
court responded to information in the prosecution's brief which indicated that in the current medical environment, after twenty weeks
of gestation, the fetus enjoys a ninety-nine percent chance of survival, stating:
[T]he "born alive" rule is outmoded, archaic and no longer
serves a useful purpose. Modern medical practice has advanced to
the point that, unlike the situation when the rule was first developed,
the vast majority of fetuses will, in the absence of some unexpected
event, be born alive and healthy."6
9. 3 COKE, INSTITUTES * 58 (1648) cited in Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.
3d 619, 625-26, 470 P.2d 617, 620, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 484 (1970) (footnote omitted).

10. Infanticide is "[t]he murder or killing of an infant soon after its birth.
The fact of the birth distinguishes this act from 'feticide' or 'procuring abortion,'
which terms denote the destruction of the fetus in the womb." BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY 699 (5th ed. 1979).
11. Infanticide is a descriptive term, not a legal term. No separate crime of
"infanticide" is recognized under the Illinois code; the killing of any living person
is homicide. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Supp. 1982).
12. Feticide is defined as the "[d]estruction of the fetus; the act by which
criminal abortion is produced." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 559 (5th ed. 1979).
13. See, e.g., State v. Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519 (1876) (indicating that no prosecution could lie for causing the death of a fetus where there was no showing of
independent life).

14. Id; see also Comment, The Non-Consensual Killing of an Unborn Infant:
A Criminal Act? 20 BUFFALO L. REv. 535, 536-38 (1971). See generally Atkinson,
Life, Birth, and Live Birth, 20 LAw Q. REV. 134 (1904).

15. 97 Mich. App. 226, 293 N.W.2d 775 (1980).
16. Id. at 232, 293 N.W.2d at 778.
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The court, however, refused to abandon the rule without legislative
action. I7
Similarly, in Keeler v. Superior Court,'8 wherein the defendant
was charged with the murder of a fetus, the state argued that in light
of advances in the fields of obstetrics and pediatrics, the exclusion
of viable fetuses from the definition of "human being" in the murder
statute was inconsistent with scientific fact.' 9 In response the court
indicated agreement with the state's premise, but found itself precluded

from remedying the inconsistency and subjecting the defendant to a

murder prosecution.2
B.

TORT LAW

Analogous to the born-alive rule in the criminal law is a similar

requirement of live birth in the law of torts. Until the middle of the
twentieth century, the common law did not allow recovery for prenatal
injuries in most cases, even where live birth of a deformed or otherwise injured child resulted.' The harshness of this rule was ameliorated
17. In refusing to abandon the born-alive rule absent legislative action, the
Michigan Appellate Court stated:
Although we find that the "born alive" rule is archaic and should be
abolished in prosecutions brought under the negligent homicide statute, the
abolition of the rule is a matter for action by the Legislature. For this Court
to interpret the statute to include unborn viable fetuses as persons would
usurp the Legislature's traditional power of defining what acts shall be
criminal and would be contrary to the decisions from other jurisdictions
cited herein.
Id. at 237-38, 293 N.W.2d at 780-81.
18. 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970).
19. The argument of the state was that:
[Tihe sciences of obstetrics and pediatrics have greatly progressed since 1872,
to the point where with proper medical care a normally developed fetus
prematurely born at 28 weeks or more has an excellent chance of survival,
i.e., is "viable"; that the common law requirement of live birth to prove
the fetus had become a "human being" who may be the victim of murder
is no longer in accord with scientific fact, since an unborn but viable fetus
is now fully capable of independent life; and that one who unlawfully and
maliciously terminates such a life should therefore be liable to prosecution
for murder under section 187.
Id. at 631, 470 P.2d at 624, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
20. The court found itself faced with "two insuperable obstacles, one 'jurisdictional' and the other constitutional." Id. Consideration of these two obstacles is
more fully undertaken at infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
21. E.g., Allaire v. St. Lukes Hospital, 184 II1. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); Drobner
v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. R. & L.
Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916). But see Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352
(La. App. 1923) (recovery allowed based on statutory language); Kinie v. Zucker-
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in a number of jurisdictions through judicial action. 2 Beginning with
Bonbrest v. Kotz, 3 this liberal trend allowed actions to be brought
for prenatal injuries, conditioned upon live birth.

However, under the common law, wrongful death actions based

on stillbirths were not permitted. 2' This policy was virtually unassailed until 1949 when the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Verkennes v.

Corniea21 allowed the plaintiff-father's wrongful death action against
a physician for the allegedly negligent conduct which led to a stillbirth.
The court commented that "[i]t seems too plain for argument that
where independent existence is possible and life is destroyed through
a wrongful act a cause of action arises." '2 6 While several states
have followed the Verkennes decision,"2 at least one commentator has
noted that the "courts are reluctant to construe the wrongful death
statutes to protect the unborn in the fullest possible manner. ' 28 Thus,
while regard for the live birth requirement has waned, it still has an

influence on the law of torts.

The born-alive rule has influenced the development of both
criminal and tort law as live birth was once a necessity before either
criminal or civil sanctions could be levied. However, advances in

modern medical technology have recently caused erosion of adherence

to the rule. The trend toward rejection of the born-alive rule has led
to an increase in legislative attempts to punish acts intended to fatal-

ly injure a fetus. The judicial response to these attempts has, not,
however, been consistently favorable.

man, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (1924) (recovery allowed, but later overruled in Berlin v.
J.C. Penny Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940)).
22. E.g., Rodriguez v. Patti, 415 Ill. 496, 114 N.E.2d 721 (1953); Damasiewicz
v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349,
102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114,
87 N.E.2d 334 (1949); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Or. 690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955).
23. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
24. E.g., Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884); Newman v. City of
Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937); Buel v. United Railways Co., 248 Mo.
126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 A. 704 (1901); Magnolia
Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 24 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).
25. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
26. Id. at 370-71, 38 N.W.2d at 841.
27. E.g., Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1970); State v. Siterman, 234
Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 257, 198 P.2d 617 (1969);
Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Kwaterski v. State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
28. Parness & Pritchard, To Be or Not to Be: Protecting the Unborn's Potentiality of Life, 51 CIN. L. REv. 257, 273 (1982).
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JUDICIAL REACTIONS TO FETICIDE LEGISLATION OUTSIDE ILLINOIS

A number of states have enacted legislation to circumvent the
born-alive rule.29 While Illinois enacted a new feticide statute, California and Louisiana are examples of states which have endeavored to
ameliorate the effects of the rule through amendment of existing
statutes. California amended its murder law, 30 and Louisiana its statute
defining the term "person. ' 31 Review of the legislation of these states,
and judicial reactions to that legislation, may provide insight into the
as of yet untested Illinois law.
A. CALIFORNIA

In the case of Keeler v. Superior Court32 the Supreme Court of
California was called upon to decide whether the California homicide
statute included an unborn but viable fetus within its definition of
"human being." The first step in the court's analysis was to evaluate
the legislative intent behind the homicide statute. The court noted
that the statute had remained in effect and unamended since 1872
and found that they "must determine the intent of the legislature at
the time of . . . enactment." ' 33 In determining that intent the court
29. The legislative enactments of three states, California, Illinois and Louisiana, exemplify attempts to expand protection for the unborn via this route. See
infra notes 43 & 69; supra note 8. While several other states have enacted feticide
statutes, see, e.g., MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 750.322 (West 1968); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 97-3-37 (1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (1981), the enactments in California and
Louisiana appear to have been the results of judicial prompting, much like the Illinois feticide statute. In each of these states, within a year of strong judicial comment on the need for legislative action before conviction for lethal injury to a fetus
could obtain, the legislators responded with statutory enactments designed to protect
the fetus. As to the relationship between court comment and legislative response in
California, see generally Comment, Intentional Killing of An Unborn Child, 2 PAC.
L. J. 170, 172-73 (1971).
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West Supp. 1983).
31. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:2(7) (West Supp. 1983) (" 'Person'
includes a human being from the moment of fertilization and implantation and also
includes a body of persons, whether incorporated or not.") with LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 14:2(7) (West 1974) (amended 1976) (" 'Person' includes a body of persons,
whether incorporated or not.").
32. 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970). In Keeler, the victim was the estranged wife of the defendant. Upon learning she was pregnant with
the child of another, Keeler stated he would "stomp it out" of her, then shoved
his knee into her abdomen and struck her face several times. As a result of this
assault the fetus was stillborn by Caesarean section. Id. at 623-24, 470 P.2d at 618-19,
87 Cal. Rptr. at 482-83.
33. Id. at 624, 470 P.2d at 619, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 483. The current homicide
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presumed the legislators to have been "familiar with the relevant rules
of the common law," 3 ' then reviewed the common law history of
the born-alive rule. The court concluded that the legislature which
had statutorily defined the term human being "intended that term
to have the settled common law meaning of a person who had been
born alive.""
After establishing the absence of legislative intent to include fetuses
within section 187, the court went on to consider arguments based
on the constitutional issues of separation of powers and due process
of law. The prosecution in Keeler argued that the born-alive rule should
be abandoned, as modern technology had rendered it devoid of basis
in reason.36 In response to this argument the court discussed the principle of separation of powers. In reference to section 6 of the California
Penal Code," the court stated: "This section embodies a fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government, i.e., that subject
to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties is vested exclusively
in the legislative branch." 3 Thus, the decision to do away with the
born-alive rule was seen as resting solely with the legislature.
In considering the guarantee of due process of law,3 9 the court
pointed out that "[tihe first essential ...is fair warning of the act which
is made punishable as a crime.""' In the court's view, to include fetuses
within the class of persons protected by section 187 would be analogous
to judicial enactment of an ex post facto law," thus denying the defenprovision was found to be the same as that found in the Penal Code of 1872. This
provision was, in turn, traced back to the Crimes and Punishment Act of 1850.
The court therefore attempted to construe the intent of the 1850 legislature. Id. at
624-28, 470 P.2d at 619-22, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 483-86.
34. Id. at 625, 470 P.2d at 619, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
35. Id. at 628, 470 P.2d at 622, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
36. See supra note 19.
37. Section 6 of the California Penal Code provides, in pertinent part, that
"no act or omission" which occurs after the penal code is in effect "is criminal
or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this code, or by some of the
statutes which it specifies as continuing in force and as not affected by its provisions, or by some ordinance, municipal, county, or township regulation." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 6 (West 1970).
38. 2 Cal. 3d at 631, 470 P.2d at 624, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
39. Since the defendant was being prosecuted under state law, the court considered the constitutional guarantee found in the due process clause of § 1 of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. That clause provides "nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
40. 2 Cal. 3d at 633, 470 P.2d at 626, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
41. The California Supreme Court, quoting the U.S. Supreme Court, stated:

[1983:91]

FETICIDE IN ILLINOIS

99

dant an essential element of due process. Consequently the court held
that, in light of the principles discussed, to extend a homicide statute
to include a viable fetus within the class of persons protected without
express legislative direction "would exceed our judicial power and deny
petitioner due process of law."" 2
Following the Supreme Court decision in Keeler, the California
legislature amended section 187 to provide that "[m]urder is the
unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice
aforethought." 3 Although this action of the legislature would
presumably allow prosecution in a fact situation similar to that found
in Keeler, that is, when there is intentional, non-consensual conduct
resulting in the death of a viable fetus, California courts have considered the applicability of the statute to varied fact patterns.
In People v. Carlson,"' the defendant killed his wife and the unborn fetus which she carried. The defendant was convicted of
manslaughter for the killing of the wife, and, since that crime is a
felony, he was convicted of second degree murder of the fetus."' On
appeal the second degree murder conviction was reversed, based on
the court's finding that the felony murder rule was inappropriate where
the homicides of two persons by the same act were construed to be
two separate offenses.46 The court reversed and did not remand the
"Indeed, an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law, such as Art. I, § 10 of the Constitution forbids." Id. at 634, 470 P.2d at 626, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 490 (quoting Bouie
v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1964)).
The enactment of ex post facto laws is prohibited by the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1 (prohibits state action); U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 9, cl. 3 (prohibits federal action). "The clauses prohibit Congress and state
legislatures from enacting laws that have a retrospective effect. In short, an ex post
facto law is a measure that has an impact on past transactions." J. NowAK, R.
ROTUNDA,

& J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 477 (2d ed. 1983)

(footnotes omitted).
42. Keeler, 2 Cal. 3d at 623, 470 P.2d at 618, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
43. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West Supp. 1983).
44. 37 Cal. App. 3d 349, 112 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1974).
45. Id. at 351, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
46. After this finding the court considered the applicability of the doctrine of
transferred intent. Id. at 354, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 325. In light of this doctrine the
court stated:
In view of the holding in Keeler that where the Legislature refers to
the unlawful killing of a "human being" it does not intend the act of feticide
• .. and the legislative distinction made between murder and manslaughter
with respect to a fetus, we have the incongruous situation that felonious
intent may be transferred where the homicide committed on the fetus is
murder but may not be transferred where the homicide committed on the
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case for trial on a charge of manslaughter of the" fetus, noting that
there was no such crime in California.4 7 As a result of this phenomenon
known as the "manslaughter gap,""' culpable conduct which does
not rise to the level of malice aforethought many go unpunished in
California.
In People v. Smith,"' the defendant was charged with forceful
assault, wife beating, criminal abortion, and murder of a human fetus.
He was convicted on the first three counts, but the murder charge
was dismissed." The state's appeal raised the issue of Whether or not
the murder statute, which proscribed killing a human fetus with malice
aforethought, encompassed "pre-viable" fetuses. In deciding that the
word "fetus" as used in the murder statute referred only to viable
fetuses, the court of appeals construed the doctrine of Roe v. Wade."
The California court interpreted Wade to be a constitutional prohibition of the inclusion of pre-viable fetuses within the class of potential victims of a homicide statute. 2 This construction of that case
appears to be erroneous.
Roe v. Wade dealt with a pregnant woman's assertion that to
deny her the opportunity to abort an unwanted pregnancy violated
her constitutional guarantee of due process of law." In considering
the validity of the Texas abortion law, the Supreme Court recognized
three conflicting, constitutionally legitimate interests. Of concern here
fetus is manslaughter since there is no crime of manslaughter in the commission of the feticide.
Id. at 356, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 326 (footnote omitted).
47. Id. at 357-58, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
48. "Manslaughter gap" is a phrase used to describe the situation in California whereby a fetus can be the victim of murder but not the lesser homicidal offenses.
For an extensive discussion of the manslaughter gap in California, see Comment,
Feticide in California: A Proposed Statutory Scheme, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 723, 725-29
(1979).
49. 59 Cal. App. 3d 751, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1976).
50. Id. at 752-53, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
51. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
52. In interpreting the decision in Roe v. Wade, the California appellate court
reached this conclusion:
The underlying rationale of Wade, therefore, is that until viability is reached,
human life in the legal sense has not come into existence. Implicit in Wade
is the conclusion that as a matter of constitutional law the destruction of
a non-viable fetus is not a taking of human life. It follows that such destruction cannot constitute murder or other form of homicide, whether committed by a mother, a father (as here), or a third person.
59 Cal. App. 3d at 757, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
53. Wade, 410 U.S. at 129.
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is the tension between two of those interests: 4 that of the state in
protecting the potentiality of human life," which increases in import
as the fetus approaches term, becoming compelling at viability; and
the fundamental right of the mother to terminate pregnancy, 6 which
experiences a relative decrease as the fetus approaches term. Since
the court found a fundamental right of the mother to be at issue,
in order to uphold the validity of the abortion law the state was
burdened with showing that it had a compelling interest sufficient
to supercede the fundamental right.5 7 The court held that this was
a burden which the state's interest did not satisfy until the third
trimester."
54. The third interest recognized in Wade, the health of the woman, is not
at issue in analysis of feticide legislation, as long as conduct, which amounts to
therapeutic abortion is excluded from prosecution.
55. Wade, 410 U.S. at 162.
56. After pointing out that the Constitution includes a right of personal privacy,
Wade, 410 U.S. at 152, the Court noted that this right included the decision to terminate
pregnancy. The Court stated: "This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153.
57. Id. at 155. When a statute is challenged as infringing a fundamental right,
the due process clause requires the state to show that the enactment furthers a compelling state interest. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621. 627 (1969);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
406 (1963).
Statutes which restrict fundamental rights also must be narrowly drawn. Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940).
Absent a fundamental right, the state is not required to show a compelling
interest is furthered by the legislation, but merely that the law bears a rational relation to a legitimate state objective. The distinction between the standards of review
employed when scrutinizing legislation involving fundamental versus nonfundamental rights has been stated as follows:
Where the government seeks to deprive persons of fundamental rights, it
must prove to the Court that the law is necessary to promote a compelling
or overriding interest. Where no such right is restricted, the law need only
rationally relate to any legitimate end of government. As long as there is
any conceivable basis for finding such rational relationship, the law will
be upheld.
J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 41, at 448. It appears that feticide
statutes would pass constitutional muster under this lower level of scrutiny. Such
statutes seem to bear a rational relationship to protecting potential life, which, according to the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, is a legitimate state interest.
58. The Wade decision also indicated that the state could regulate second
trimester abortions if based on the interest of the health of the mother. The interests
in Wade were expressed as existing on a continuum. The Supreme Court described
the interplay of these interests as follows:
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People v. Smith, however, involved the death of a fetus which
resulted from non-consensual acts by a third person" rather than a
mother's decision to abort. Thus the issue presented to the California Court of Appeals differed from Wade in that there was no fundamental constitutional right asserted to counterpoise the legitimate
interest of the state in protecting potential life. Since the third party
actor has no fundamental right to terminate the pregnancy, in responding to his or her constitutional challenge, the state need not show
a compelling interest; showing a reasonable relationship between the
statute and a legitimate state objective is all that due process would
require.
In the absence of concern for the mother's fundamental right,
Roe v. Wade is inapposite. Consequently, to hold that the Constitution prohibits penalization for injuries to non-viable fetuses under
criminal statutes goes beyond the dictates of the Wade decision. Despite
this apparent flaw in the court's rationale, the holding in People v.
Smith remains valid, and the murder statute of California does not
preclude the killing of a pre-viable fetus.
In People v. Apodaca,6" the defendant stood convicted of murdering a viable human fetus, rape, and assault. On appeal, he claimed
that the murder statute, as it related to the killing of an unborn child,
was impermissibly vague and should therefore be held void.6 ' The
requirement of definiteness in the void for vagueness doctrine6 2 is
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester,
the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother,
may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are
reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and
even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.

Wade, 410 U.S. at 164-65.

59. "Non-consensual" refers to the absence of consent on the part of the
mother. "Third person" refers to an actor other than the mother or physician who
may be privileged in the abortion context.
60. 76 Cal. App. 3d 479, 142 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1978).
61. Id. at 485, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 835. The defendant also contended that the
failure of the trial court to instruct the jury that the law applied only to the killing
of viable fetuses was reversible error. Since the fetus involved in Apodaca was found
to be viable, the court of appeals held it was not required to address the question
of viability. Id. at 486-87, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 835-36.
62. The void for vagueness doctrine has been stated as follows: "[A] statute
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violated if the statute fails to provide fair notice of the criminality
63
of the contemplated conduct to a person of ordinary intelligence.

Applying this doctrine to the facts of the case, the court held that
Apodaca had the requisite notice and was "fully and adequately warned"
that killing a viable fetus could subject him to prosecution for the
crime of murder.6 ' This affirmation of the constitutionality of the
murder law has not been overruled, and the statute remains in effect. 5
B. LOUISIANA

Rather than amend its murder law the State of Louisiana redefined
the class of potential victims under its criminal code. This redefinition followed the decision of State v. Gyles.", In Gyles, the defendant moved to quash an indictment for second degree murder based
on the death of an eight-month-old fetus. He allegedly caused the
death by beating the mother with a stick and his fists. In granting
the defendant's motion, the court held that the murder statute incorporated the common law definition of the crime of murder which
"contemplat[ed]

only the killing of those human beings who have
been born alive."167 While it did not doubt the constitutional power
of the state to criminalize such conduct, the court felt it was not

which purports to provide for punishment, without making sufficiently precise just
what is punishable thereunder, is held to be 'void for vagueness.' " R. PERKINS &
R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 6 (3d ed. 1982) (footnote omitted).
63. In United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), the defendants asserted
that certain provisions were "too vague and indefinite to meet the requirements of
due process." Id. at 617. In considering this argument the Court stated:
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute
that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that the contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is
that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he would
not reasonably understand to be proscribed.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979)
(the fundamental principles of due process mandate that "no individual be forced
to speculate, at the peril of indictment, whether his conduct is prohibited"); Colautti
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979) (recognizing the principle of fair notice stated
in Harriss as a settled matter of due process); Rose, Warden v. Locke, 423 U.S.
48, 49 (1975) (fair warning requirement of the due process clause prohibits holding
defendant " 'criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.' " (quoting Harriss)).
64. Apodaca, 76 Cal. App. 3d at 486, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
65. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West Supp. 1983).
66. 313 So. 2d 799 (La. 1975).
67. Id. at 800.
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at liberty to extend the statutory definition of the crime, absent
legislative action."
In response to this decision the Louisiana legislature amended

the definition of "person" in its criminal code. 6 However, in State

v. Brown," the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that this amendment was, at best, a legislative attempt to implicitly include feticide

in the homicide statute. 7 ' The court noted that "[h]omicide is not
the killing of a 'person', but is the killing of a 'human being', ...
a phrase which has been restricted to those born alive throughout

the United States in relation to the crime of murder."" In order to
reach the desired end of extending the protection of the homicide
statute"3 the legislature would either have to amend that statute or
enact a separate statutory definition of "human being." Since there
has been no such legislative action to date, the crime of homicide
in Louisiana does not include the killing of a fetus.
The statutory history of the Louisiana act, including subsequent
case law, as well as the history of the California provision, illustrates

that in order to clothe the unborn with the protection of homicide

statutes the born-alive rule must be circumvented by explicit language.
In addition to clearly including the fetus in the class to be protected,
the terms and scope of that inclusion should be clearly defined. The
necessity of well defined parameters is exemplified by cases such as
People v. Carlson."'The "manslaughter gap" recognized in Carlson
68. Id. at 802.
69. See supra note 31. The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in State v. Brown,
378 So. 2d 916 (La. 1980), viewed the action of the legislature as having been prompted
by an intent to include the "fertiliz[ed] and implant[ed]" fetus in each of the various
provisions of the code. Id. at 918.
70. 378 So. 2d 916 (La. 1980). The defendant, Michael Brown, was charged
with the second degree murder of Harriet St. Andre and with " 'murder of a fertilized
implanted fetus in the womb of Harriet St. Andre.' " Id. at 917 (quoting the indictment). He was convicted of manslaughter on the first count and, after his motion
to quash the indictment for killing the fetus was overruled, pleaded guilty to
manslaughter of the fetus.
71. The court stated: "The State maintains that this amendment was meant
to redefine 'hurman being' and thus implicitly amend [the statute] defining homicide."
This implicit amendment was found to be improper in that "[iut is clearly within
the legislature's constitutional power to redefine homicide to specifically include
feticide, but to do so implicitly is prohibited." Id. at 917.
72. Id.
73. The Louisiana homicide statute provides "Homicide is the killing of a human
being by the act, procurement or culpable omission of another. Criminal homicide
is of four grades: (1) First degree murder (2) Second degree murder (3) Manslaughter
(4) Negligent homicide." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:29 (West Supp. 1983).
74. 37 Cal. App. 3d 349, 112 Cal. Rptr. 321(1974) (manslaughter gap); see
infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.

FETICIDEIN ILLINOIS

[1983:91]

is an example of the anomolous situation which can occur as a result
of an inexplicit definition. A similar situation has been presented in
cases which have dealt with vehicular homicide.75 In vehicular homicide
cases, as with murder, the born-alive rule precludes prosecution, ab16
sent specific legislative pronouncement to the contrary.

IV.

FETICIDE IN ILLINOIS

Not unlike their counterparts in California and Louisiana, Illinois
legislators enacted a provision designed to punish conduct which results
in the killing of a human fetus. This occurred after the born-alive
rule led to acquital on charges relating to fetal death in People v.
Greer7 and People v. Osborn."
A.

CASE LAW

In People v. Greer the defendant's conviction for killing a viable
fetus was reversed by the Illinois Supreme Court.7 9 The court's decision was based on the born-alive rule, which it applied stating: "If
75. Vehicular homicide is a form of negligent homicide which results from the
operation of a motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner. Generally, negligent
homicide statutes provide for penalties less severe than those for involuntary
manslaughter. See generally R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 62, at 116-19.
The comments to the Model Penal Code point out that vehicular homicide is
the most common type of negligent homicide. The comments state that "competent
authorities have estimated that as many as 99% of all negligent homicides involve
automobiles." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 comment 4 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1980).
A number of states have enacted vehicular homicide statutes. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 192(3) (West 1970); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-3 (1981); MICH. COMP.

LAWS ANN. § 750.324 (West 1968).
76. See People v. Guthrie, 97 Mich. App. 226, 293 N.W.2d 775 (1980) (court
found the born-alive rule to be archaic, and agreed that it "should be abolished
in prosecutions . . .under the negligent homicide statute" but held that abolition
of the rule was a legislative concern); State v. Willis, 98 N.M. 771, 652 P.2d 1222
(Ct. App. 1982) (unborn fetus not a human being for purposes of the state's vehicular
homicide statute); State v. Dickinson, 28 Ohio St. 2d 65, 175 N.E.2d 599 (1971)
(viable unborn fetus not within subject of a statute making it a felony to cause the
death of another while operating a vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol);
State v. Amaro, 448 A.2d 1257 (R.I. 1982) (in the vehicular homicide statute, "person" does not include unborn child); State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978)
(absent legislative action, automobile homicide statute does not proscribe acts which
result in death of an unborn child).
77. 79 Il. 2d 103, 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980).
78. 111 Il1. App. 3d 1078, 444 N.E.2d 1158 (1981).
79. Greer, 79 Ill.
2d at 116, 402 N.E.2d at 209 (1980) (defendant beat his girlfriend to death, causing as well the death of the fetus she carried; court reversed
the murder conviction based on the death of the fetus).
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the fetus survives long enough to be born and take a single breath,
the defendant committed homicide. If, however, the fetus expires during birth, or just before, homicide has not occurred." 8
After restatement of the born-alive rule, the court rejected
arguments by the state that advances in medical science, which had
led to protection of the interests of the unborn in the tort context,
justified extension of the homicide statute to include the unborn."
Having reaffirmed the born-alive rule, the court pointed out that the
anomalous results it causes could be avoided by legislative enactment
of a separate feticide statute.8
In People v. Osborn 3 the defendant kicked the victim, who had
been pregnant for nine and one-half months, in the stomach." The
stillbirth of the fetus she carried resulted. Osborn was charged with
aggravated battery; no attempt was made to prosecute for the fetal
death. 5 Somewhat ironically, evidence of the stillbirth was used to
show "great bodily harm" to the mother, an element necessary to
sustain a conviction for aggravated battery. 6
80. Id. at 111, 402 N.E.2d at 207.
81. The state's argument was that:
[Tjhe same problems which underlay the reluctance at the common law to
consider the killing of a fetus as murder were also the basis of similar reluctance to extend tort remedies to encompass pre-natal injuries. Since this
court has discounted those problems in the tort area and has held that a
viable fetus is a "person" within the meaning of the Wrongful Death Act
• . . [the court] should also recognize that a viable fetus is an "individual"
under the homicide statute.
Id. at 113, 402 N.E.2d at 208.
The rationale behind this refusal to extend protection to the fetus was that
when the legislature enacted the homicide law it was aware that the killing of a fetus
was not a homicide at common law, yet failed to include the unborn within the
statute or enact a separate feticide statute. Id. at 116, 402 N.E.2d at 209.
82. Id.
83. 111 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 444 N.E.2d 1158 (1981).
84. Id. at 1080, 444 N.E.2d at 1160. The defendant was working on his car
in the parking lot of a car wash when the victims, the Eppersons, arrived. A dispute
arose as to who was first in line, during which the defendant began to strike the
Epperson's truck with a wrench. Armed with wrenches, the two men fought. After
her husband was struck on the head, Mrs. Epperson attempted to intervene, at which
time she was kicked by the defendant.
85. Mrs. Epperson was taken to the hospital after the fight, and was delivered
of a stillborn baby the next day. Even though medical testimony showed that the
blow to the mother's stomach was the cause of fetal death, Osborn was simply charged
with two counts of aggravated battery and one count of felony criminal damage
to property. Id. at 1079, 444 N.E.2d at 1159. The state's awareness of the supreme
court's Greer ruling, coupled with the absence of legislative action by that time,
may have made prosecution for the feticide appear futile.
86. The defendant appealed his conviction for aggravated battery against
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B.

FETICIDEIN ILLINOIS

THE NEW ILLINOIS FETICIDE STATUTE

The decisions in People v. Greer and People v. Osborn prompted
the Illinois Legislature to act.8 ' On March 4, 1981, Senator Randy
Thomas introduced Senate Bill 192 to the Eighty-second General
Assembly,88 proposing the addition of paragraph 9-1.1 to chapter
38 of the Illinois Revised Statutes.8 9 The bill passed both houses of
the General Assembly" and was signed by the Governor on August
21, 1981. 91
Since this legislative attempt to punish conduct by defendants
such as Greer and Osborn is as yet untested in the courts of Illinois,
consideration of how the new feticide statute may be interpreted is
in order. Such an analysis entails review of the language utilized by
the legislature to ascertain the probability of due process or separation of powers violations such as those recognized in Keeler v. Superior
Court.9 2 A review of the language of the statute will also be helpful
in determining what elements of the crime the prosecutors must
establish, as well as the specific types of conduct proscribed.
Susan Epperson theorizing that the state failed to prove that she had suffered great
bodily harm. The defendant argued that causing the death of a 9 1/2 month old
fetus did not constitute great bodily harm to the mother since the fetus was not
part of the mother. The court of appeals rejected this argument, pointing out that
"a blow to the mother which does physical harm to the child necessarily involves
harm to the mother as well," and that the question of harm was one of fact. Id.
at 1081, 444 N.E.2d at 1160.
87. See supra note 6. In addition to the debates of both houses of the General
Assembly, the bill analysis prepared in the Senate Judiciary II Committee pointed
out the relationship between the two decisions and Senate Bill 192. See STAFF OF
ILLINOIS SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY 1I, BILL ANALYSIS OF S. 192, 82nd Gen.
Assembly (1981).
88. See I LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS AND DIGEST OF THE 1981 SESSION OF THE EIGHTYSECOND GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 103-04 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS].
The original bill was amended twice. The first amendment deleted the word
"viable" before the word "fetus" in the preamble to subsection (a); added justifiable
feticide to subsection (c)(3); and provided, in subsection (d), that the death penalty
could not be imposed. The second amendment omitted the exception created in the
original subsection (c)(3), which had excepted conduct when "the act was solicited,
aided, abetted, or consented to by the mother of the fetus." Id.
89. S. 192, 82nd Gen. Assembly, 1981 Sess.
90. The Act passed the Senate on May 19, 1981, the House on June 18, 1981.
The Senate vote was 52 aye, 2 nay, and 0 present. The vote in the House was 115
aye, 17 nay, and 11 present. LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS, supra note 88, at 103-04.
91. LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS, supra note 88, at 104.
92. 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970); see supra notes
33-42 and accompanying text.
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1. Constitutional Considerations
The existence of a valid statute vitiates a court's concern over
violating the separation of powers doctrine. As long as the judicial
action taken is in accordance with enacted legislation, there should
be no violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Where legislative
action has been taken and a legislative intent expressed, as in Illinois,
the function of the court becomes one of statutory interpreter, a role
within the ambit of the judiciary branch.9" The factors a court must
weigh in a due process" action are quite distinct from those considered when a separation of powers question is at issue. A statute
which does not clearly apprise an actor that his conduct is criminal
may be challenged as being void for vagueness. In reviewing a statute
so challenged, a court must look to the language of the statute in
order to make the critical determination as to whether the language
"give[s] a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute." 9
While the Illinois feticide statute has not yet faced a due process
challenge, the similar statutes in both California and Louisiana have.96
While the Louisiana Supreme Court held the "implicit" inclusion of
the fetus in the criminal code violative of due process, 9 the express
inclusion of the fetus in the language of the California homicide statute
allowed that law to be found valid. 9' The Illinois feticide law, expressly including fetuses and calling for knowledge of the pregnancy
and fetal viability, is more closely akin to the California law. 99 To
the extent that Illinois courts follow the precedential pattern of the
courts of their sister states, the new feticide law should be found to
provide adequate notice to satisfy due process requirements.

93. The propriety of judicial interpretation of the laws has been recognized
for a number of years. In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the
Supreme Court stated, "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Id. at 177.
94. Due process as addressed herein focuses on whether the potential defendant has received sufficient notice that the contemplated conduct is criminal, a facet
of procedural due process.
95. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). See supra note 63.
96. See supra notes 42, 71 and accompanying text.
97. See State v. Brown, 378 So. 2d 916 (La. 1980), discussed supra at notes
70-73 and accompanying text.
98. See People v. Apodaca, 76 Cal. App. 3d 479, 142 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1978),
discussed supra at notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
99. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1.1 (1981) with CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 187 (West Supp. 1983) and LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.2 (7) (West Supp. 1983).
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2.
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The Elements of the Crime

The language of the feticide law indicates that when the legislature
was drafting legislation to create criminal sanctions for the act of
feticide, it looked to the existing homicide statute for guidance. 0 0
Thus, in examining the elements of the crime of feticide, a comparison
of its provisions with the parallel provisions of the murder law, and
a contrast of the effect of differences between the two statutes, may
provide insight into the new law's effect.
The first subsection of the Illinois feticide law defines the crime
of feticide. The preamble to subsection (a) limits prosecution under
and are
the statute to acts which result in the death of a "fetus"''
without lawful justification, while the murder statute proscribes, on
similar terms, the killing of an "individual."' 0 2 Other statutory attempts to protect fetuses have been undercut by a judicially imposed
requirement that the statute expressly include the unborn. 0 3 The
language chosen for the Illinois feticide statute should effectively circumvent challenges based on lack of specificity.
Subsections (a)(1) and (2) of both statutes describe the mens rea
required for the crimes."' The mental state required for conviction
under the murder statute has been interpreted to be either intent or
knowledge.' 0 The courts would likely attach a similar interpretation
100. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1.1 (1981) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 9-1 (Supp. 1982). The duplication of the language in the two laws evidences
the relationship between them. The murder law provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits
murder if, in performing the acts which cause death:
(1) He either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or
another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or
another; or
(2) He knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to that individual or another; or
(3) He is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than voluntary
manslaughter.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Supp. 1982).
101. The term "fetus" within the meaning of the statute is limited to fetuses
which were capable, at the time of death, of life outside the mother, i.e., viable fetuses.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1.1(b) (1981). See supra note 8.
102. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Supp. 1982).

103. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 378 So. 2d 916 (La. 1980), discussed supra at
notes 70-73.
104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 9-(a)(1), (2) and 9-1.1(a)(1),(2) (Supp. 1982
and 1981); see supra note 8.
105. People v. Harris, 72 Ill. 2d 16, 23, 377 N.E.2d 28, 31 (1978); People v.
Mikel, 73 Ill. App. 3d 16, 18-19, 391 N.E.2d 558, 561 (1979).

The statute defining "intent" states: "A person intends, or acts intentionally
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to the feticide provisions of the code. However, a distinction between
the mens rea requirements of murder and feticide surfaces upon
consideration of the identity of the person at whom the act, performed

with conscious intent or knowledge of a strong probability of death

or great bodily harm, is aimed. The murder statute criminalizes conduct resulting in the death of an individual where the requisite mens

rea toward that individual or another existed," ° " thereby incorporating
the doctrine of transferred intent. In contrast, the feticide law
criminalizes conduct resulting in the death of a fetus, where the requisite
mens rea toward the mother existed.'0 7 The effect of this wording
is to require a "specific" transfer of intent,10 8 while precluding general
application of that doctrine. Conduct in which the requisite state of
mind exists toward the mother is required for the offense, while conduct directed toward "another" is not included.' 9 This distinction
may be illustrated as follows:
X intends to kill Y, but when X shoots at Y, the bullet misses its
mark, passes through a closed door, and kills Z, whom X did not
know to be present. Under the homicide provisions the state of mind
X possessed toward Y transfers to his killing of Z and the act is

or with intent, to accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the statute
defining the offense, when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that
result or engage in that conduct." hIL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-4 (1981).
Knowledge is defined as follows:
A person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of:
(a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his conduct . . . when

he is consciously aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the
substantial probability that such fact exists.
(b) The result of his conduct . . . when he is consciously aware that

such result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct.
Conduct performed knowingly or with knowledge is performed wilfully,
within the meaning of a statute using the latter term, unless the statute
clearly requires another meaning.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-5 (1981).
106. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a)(1), (2) (Supp. 1982); see supra note 100.

107. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1.1(a)(1), (2) (1981); see supra note 8.
108. The terms "specific" transfer and "general" transfer are utilized to describe
transfers under the feticide and murder statutes respectively. The feticide statute incorporates "specific" transfer by requiring transfer of intent from mother to fetus,
but precluding transfer from anyone other than the mother to the fetus. The murder
statute incorporates "general" transfer in that the transfer therein is the ordinary
transferred intent recognized in criminal law. The general transfer has been stated
as "where A aims at B but misses, hitting C-it is the view of the criminal law
that A is just as guilty as if his aim had been accurate." W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT
JR., supra note 5, § 35 at 252.
109. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1.1(a)(l), (2)(1981); see supra note 8.
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murder. However, if Z is the fetus in utero, the intent to kill Y
is not transferred to the killing of Z and neither homicide nor feticide
has occurred.
Since the crime of feticide requires that the mens rea with which the
actor kills a fetus be directed toward the mother, when an actor intends to kill the fetus, without the requisite state of mind toward
the mother, ' the requirements of subsections 9-1 .1(a)(1) and (2) would
not be met.
However, the failure of subsections 9-1.1(a)(1) and (2) to include
harmful acts directed against the fetus should not absolutely preclude
prosecutions for such acts; subsection 9-1. 1(a)(3)'" will allow for prosecution in many such situations.
Under subsection (a)(3) of the homicide statute,"' generally known
as the felony murder rule, conduct which results in the death of an
individual is murder if the actor was "attempting or committing a
forcible felony other than voluntary manslaughter."II3 Likewise, subsection 9-1. 1(a)(3) adopts a felony feticide provision for acts which constitute forcible felonies "against the mother other than voluntary
manslaughter.""" The commission of a statutorily defined forcible
felony'" against the mother which results in the death of the fetus
can be prosecuted under subsection 9-1.1(a)(3).
While further extending protection to the fetus, the wording of
the felony feticide provision, in excluding voluntary manslaughter
against the mother, creates the possibility of the anomalous result
illustrated in the following example:
If X commits an aggravated battery against the mother, Y, of a
fetus, Z, and the death of Z results, X may be prosecuted for two
felonies; feticide, under the felony feticide provision, and aggravated
battery. However, if X commits what is determined to be voluntary
manslaughter against the mother, and Z dies as well, the actor can
be prosecuted for the crime of voluntary manslaughter but not
feticide.
110. While a situation in which the death of the fetus would result without at
least a strong possibility of death or great bodily harm to the mother is unlikely,
the possibility does exist, as the question of great bodily harm is one of fact. See,
e.g., People v. Dowdy, 21 111. App. 3d 821, 316 N.E.2d 33 (1974); People v. Smith,
6 Ill. App. 3d 259, 285 N.E.2d 460 (1972).
111. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1.1(a)(3) (1981); see supra note 8.
112. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a)(3) (Supp. 1982); see supra note 100.
113. Id.
114. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1.1(a)(3) (1981).
115. Id. at § 2-8.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

Feticide will not have occurred, since voluntary manslaughter cannot support a conviction for felony feticide, and the mental state of
knowledge or intent to harm the mother would not be satisfied. Consequently, conduct of the defendant resulting in the death of both
mother and fetus is punished less severely than where only one death,
that of the fetus, occurs."'
In the murder context, the rationale of excluding voluntary
manslaughter from the list of crimes sufficient to support a felony

murder conviction is that failure to do so would destroy the crime

of voluntary manslaughter. ' 7 In contrast,

allowing voluntary

manslaughter to be an underlying felony in potential feticide prosecu-

tions would have no effect on the voluntary manslaughter statute.
By allowing voluntary manslaughter of the mother to support a felony
feticide, the legislature could have closed the gap whereby two kill-

ings are punished less severely than one.
In addition to the previously discussed problems with the feticide
statute, the case of People v. Bolar ' 8 illustrates another possible
stumbling block within the statute: the requirement of knowledge of
pregnancy."1 9 In Bolar, the defendant, an intoxicated motorist, drove

his vehicle into an automobile in which a woman who was more than

eight months pregnant was a passenger. The death of the fetus resulted
and Bolar was convicted of reckless homicide. 1' Although the Illinois

Court of Appeals intimated that fact patterns similar to Bolar may
come under the feticide provision,' 21 it appears doubtful that the pros-

ecution could satisfy the statutory requirement that the defendant

knew or reasonably should have known that the mother was
pregnant.' 2
116. Where only the death of the fetus occurs, feticide will lie; since feticide
is subject to the same punishment as murder, a sentence of not less than 20
years will result. However, when the only indictable offense is voluntary manslaughter,
a class 2 felony carrying a maximum sentence of seven years, the punishment will
be less severe, in spite of there being two victims. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 1005-8-1 (1981).
117. See People v. Carpi, 44 I11.App. 3d 364, 358 N.E.2d 355 (1976). The court
stated: "It is apparent that if voluntary manslaughter were included in the section
defining felony murder, the legislature would be completely destroying the offense
.. . because any defendant who would commit a voluntary manslaughter would
then be committing the greater offense of murder." Id. at 372-73, 358 N.E.2d at 362.
118. -109 Ill. App. 3d 384, 440 N.E.2d 639 (1982).
119. ILL. REV.

120.
121.
found to
122.

STAT.

ch. 38, § 9-l.1(a)(4) (1981); see supra note 8.

Bolar, 109 Ill. App. 3d at 385, 440 N.E.2d at 640-41.
In Bolar, the court did not apply the feticide statute because the fetus was
have been born alive. Id. at 386-88, 440 N.E.2d at 642-43.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1.1(a)(4) (1981); see supra note 8. In addition
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While the requirement that the actor knew or should have known
that the victim was a pregnant woman prohibits extension of the new
feticide statute to conduct amounting to reckless homicide, an examination of the legislative record indicates that the statute may be
more expansive than the legislature intended. The Illinois House debates
indicate that in drafting the statute the legislature intended to limit
prosecution to situations where there was "some sign, [a] visible sign
that a defendant would know, be put on notice that the person is
pregnant." ' ' 3 This indicates that they intended to punish only more
culpable, knowing conduct, as well as assure that adequate notice had
been provided. However, while seemingly attempting to limit the scope
of criminality the legislature in fact made the scope of the offense
more broad with the addition of subsection (a)(4).
The Illinois statute addressing mental states provides that if a
statute defining an offense requires a particular mental state for the
crime as a whole, then the state of mind requirement applies to each
element of the offense.' 24 Applied to section 9-1.1, the intent or
knowledge required under subsections 9-1.1(a)(1) and (2) would be
required as to the attendant circumstance of pregnancy. In the absence
of section 9-1.1 (a)(4), actual, subjective knowledge of pregnancy would
be required. While the statutory definition of "intent" makes no
reference to attendant circumstances,' 2 5 the statute defining
"knowledge" would be satisfied only if the defendant was "consciously
aware that ... such circumstances exist[ed]" or was aware of "the
substantial probability that such facts exist[ed]," i.e., if s/he had subjective knowledge.' 26
With the inclusion of the section (a)(4) requirement that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the pregnancy, the
legislature distinguished the attendant circumstance, and thereby
avoided application of the mental states of subsections 9-1. l(a)(1) and
(2) to that circumstance. 2 While the requirement that the defendant
to the problem of proving knowledge of pregnancy, there is a question as to whether
the prosecution could show the mental state required by the feticide statute. Subsections 9-1.1(a)(l) and (2) require knowledge or intent, see supra note 105, while conduct which comes under the involuntary manslaughter and reckless homicide statute
rises only to the level of recklessness. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-3 (1981).
123. Ill. House Debates, 82nd Gen. Assembly, 66th Legislative Day (June 18,
1981) (statement of Representative Ronald A. Stearney) (available on microfiche at
169).
124. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-3(b) (1981).
125. Id. at § 4-4, discussed supra at note 105.
126. Id.at § 4-5.
127. When a distinction as to the mental state required is made amidst the
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"knew" of the pregnancy would have effected no substantive change,
the addition of "or reasonably should have known" allows the
requirement to be satisfied by a showing of objective knowledge. Consequently, the net effect of including subsection 9-1.1(a)(4) was to
ease the qualitative burden on the prosecutor. By lightening this burden

the legislature has slightly expanded the scope of the new statute rather
than limited it.
Subsection (d) calls for proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the fetus was capable of independent life. ' This provision further
limits the scope of the statute, and appears to follow the legislative
intent, expressed in debate, that there be no prosecution where there
were no visible signs of pregnancy. However, limitation to viable
fetuses appears to create a policy clash between this statute and another
law concerned with the unborn, the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975.129

Therein it is stated that the policy of the state is to protect "the right
to life of the unborn child from conception.""'3

The apparent

difference in policy between the two laws further evidences the
legislature's interest in proceeding cautiously in this new area of law,
punishing only conduct which appears to be more highly culpable.
This limitation to acts evidencing heightened culpability may also be
due to the severity of the penalty available for feticide as compared
to the penalty for criminal abortion.' 3 '

elements, § 4-3(b) does not extend the same mental state to each element. See id.
at § 4-3(b).
128. See id.at § 9-1.1(b); supra note 8; see also supra note 101.
129. Abortion Law of 1975, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 81-21 to 81-35 (1981).
130. Id. at § 81-21 (emphasis added). The statement of legislative intent inthe
abortion statute indicates that the state has an interest inprotecting pre-birth human
life. The provision further recognizes the existence of constitutional restraints placed
on its exercise of authority to further that interest. The statement goes on, however,
to indicate that if the constitutional constraints of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), are ever removed, "the former policy of
this State to prohibit abortions unless necessary for the preservation of the mother's
life shall be reinstated." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-21 (1981). The second paragraph
of § 81-21, added by amendment in 1980, moderates the initial policy statement by
recognizing the state's interest in protecting the woman's health and the privacy of
her decision to abort, as well as the interest of the infant and unborn child. While
the state retains its original interest in protecting the child, it has recognized, as
did the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, an interest inprotecting the mother's right
to privacy in choosing to terminate her pregnancy.
Since § 9-1.1(c)(1) of the feticide statute excludes conduct which the state has
recognized as a legitimate exercise of the woman's choice (by excepting conduct
which complies with the Abortion Law of 1975), the statute does not in any way
narrow the state's recognition of the mother's privacy rights.
131. The penalty for feticide is the same as murder, with the exception of the
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While reviewing the apparent policy considerations which underlie
the feticide statute one additional point, concerning the transfer of
intent,' 3 2 should be raised. The decision to exclude the general doctrine of transferred intent, while requiring a specific transfer (an act
against the mother injurious to the fetus), may well be due to certain
policy considerations. The following example highlights this possible
policy concern:
An actor, X, intends to kill Y, but in fact kills Z, whose presence
was unknown. X's mens rea toward Y is transferred to the actual
victim, Z. This transfer may be referred to as a transfer once removed, as the intent to kill a victim whose presence X did not know
of is imputed. If in the same factual situation Z were eight months
pregnant, the transfer of intent to the fetus could be viewed as
transfer twice removed, since X would not only be imputed with
knowledge of Z's presence, but of her pregnancy as well.
In considering the appropriateness of allowing intent to be transferred, this "transfer twice removed" may have been viewed as allowing results whereby the nexus between the defendant's culpability and
the secondary victim appeared too tenuous to allow prosecution. Thus,
by limiting prosecution to conduct which was directed against the
mother, the legislature avoided the problem of transfer twice removed.
As to the remaining sections of the statute, subsection (c) excludes
from prosecution acts which, though causing fetal death, are justified,
lawful, or amount to therapeutic abortion.' 3 3 Subsection (d) provides
the penalty for violation by analogy to the penalties for murder, with
the exception of the death penalty.' 3 Finally, subsection (e) states
"the provisions of this section shall not be construed to prohibit prosdeath penalty. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1.1(d) (1981). Criminal abortion is, at
most, a class 2 felony. Id. at § 81-23.1 (A).Thus, the maximum sentence for feticide
is natural life while the maximum under the abortion law is seven years. Id. at
§ 1005-8-1.
132. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
133. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1.1(c) (1981); see supra note 8. Subsection (c)(l)'
excludes conduct which is lawful under the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975. Id., §§ 81-21
to 81-35. Subsection (c)(2) excludes conduct which amounts to therapeutic abortion.
A therapeutic abortion is one performed by a licensed physician based on his belief
that maternal mortality due to childbirth is, if not "medically certain," at least
"substantially certain or more likely than not." Subsection (c)(3) excludes conduct
which comports with Article 7 of the Criminal Code of 1961. Article 7 deals with
justifiable uses of force in defense of person. Id., §§ 7-1 to 7-14. Subsection (c)(3)
acknowledges the defense of justifiable feticide.
134. Id. at § 9-1.1(d); see supra note 8. The original bill, as proposed by Senator
Randy Thomas, allowed the death penalty. The death penalty was eliminated from
the statute by Senate Amendment No. 1. See LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS, supra note 88.
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ecution of any person under any other provision of law."'
In addition to the policy concerns of fairness to the defendant,
political concerns connected with the abortion issue may have influenced the substance of the legislation enacted. With the intensity of
debate on the abortion issue in modern society, any legislation dealing
with the unborn will probably be looked upon with suspicion by proponents of either side of the abortion issue. The legislators are concerned with the view of both sides and the political realities of the
situation require them to try to moderate any action so that all are
satisfied. This concern with satisfying both right-to-life and pro-choice
groups in the feticide statute is indicated by a statement of the bill's
sponsor'3 6 in the Senate debate. Of the bill, sponsor Randy Thomas
stated:
We're pleased to tell you that some of the groups who have traditionally opposed this bill are not opposing it now. I'm speaking
because of the fact that we do definitely address the Illinois Abortion Law so that the people who are for pro-choice are not in opposition to this. We are also not impeding the language of some
of the goals and ideas of the pro-life people, [and] as a result, they
are not in opposition to this.'
While the desire for political moderation justifies the exception
of lawful abortion and therapeutic abortion from prosecution, it does
not fully explain why the legislature chose the language it did. It does
not appear that the inclusion of pre-viable fetuses within the statute
or an allowance of general transfer of intent would necessarily be
opposed by either the pro-choice or right-to-life supporters. Although
the pro-choice advocates do not support the total protection of human
fetuses supported by the right-to-life proponents, the principles behind
allowing a mother to terminate an unwanted pregnancy do not appear
to be furthered by excluding those who destroy fetal life absent the
mother's choice to terminate pregnancy from prosecution under the
feticide statute.
V.

CONCLUSION

The enactment of the feticide statute in Illinois represents a positive
135. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1.1(e) (1981); see supra note 8. Subsection (e)
makes it clear that the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975 remains in full force and effect
notwithstanding the enactment of the feticide statute.
136. Senator Randy Thomas was responsible for the drafting of the bill, and
was the Senate sponsor. Representative Jack Davis was the House sponsor. See
LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS, supra note 88.
137. I11.
Senate Debates, 82nd Gen. Assembly, 41st Legislative Day (May 19,
1981) (available on microfiche at 198).
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and progressive attitude toward ameliorating a common-law doctrine
which, in contemporary society, has repeatedly been shown to be of
questionable validity. The Illinois legislature has, through the feticide
statute, diminished the effects of the born-alive rule. In so doing,
the legislature has significantly increased the protection which the
criminal laws of Illinois provide the unborn.
The legislation drafted and enacted by the Illinois General
Assembly appears to be free of the fatal defects examined in discussion of the laws of California and Louisiana. Further, the enactment
appears to be within the constitutional constraints of Roe v. Wade.
The legislature has taken affirmative steps to further the state's interest in protecting potential life without infringing the mother's fundamental privacy right.
While the new law increases the protection afforded the unborn,
there remain some acts which do not come within the feticide statute
in spite of the actor's apparent culpability. Although the perception
of political realities, in the sense of conflict among constituents over
the abortion issue, may prevent the legislature from further protecting the human fetus, such extensions could be made without offending the protections recognized in Roe v. Wade.
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